Research
One research stream feeds everything BCR publishes: a commercial report series for institutions, public deep dives, and the monitoring surfaces on this site.
Featured: The Chokepoint Consequence Monitor
Price reporting agencies tell you what a critical mineral costs. Supply and entity databases tell you where it comes from and who sits in the chain. These tools are not primarily designed to provide a recurring assessment of what happens next when a chokepoint actually closes, whether by export licensing, sanctions, content rules, or transshipment enforcement: which downstream costs move and by how much, which lead times stretch, which production schedules slip, how wide the substitution window really is, and what the policy response is likely to be. The Monitor is built to be the standing answer to the question the price and the map both leave open.
A quarterly report series, scoped one line per chokepoint or mineral complex. Every issue carries the same sections in the same order: what changed since the prior issue; the transmission chain from event to mechanism to consequence; observable indicators with sources, readings, and thresholds; alternative scenarios with registered probabilities; and what would invalidate the read, written before the evidence arrives.
Built for government minerals and economic-security analysts, defense-industrial supply-chain programs and the primes supporting them, and corporate procurement and strategy desks with direct critical-minerals exposure.
Pre-launch. Initial coverage hypothesis: rare-earth separation and permanent magnets, being validated with early readers. Copper mine and refining lead times held as the likely second line.
A state-level sample
Arizona's Strategic Exposure to Mexico-China Supply-Chain Integration, an open-source dependency assessment at U.S.-state level, is available as a sample on request.
THE RESEARCH LIBRARY
Published research
Public research from the BCR desk. Each page carries the core findings and links onward to the related work and the live monitors.
Copper: a lead-time-governed supply gap
Published July 2026
A supply-generous simulation of every announced source of new copper still leaves the world roughly 8.5 million tonnes short of projected 2040 demand. The constraint is time: a new copper mine takes roughly 15 to 17 years from discovery to first metal, so projects reaching a final investment decision from 2026 onward deliver a median of 0.6 million tonnes by 2040. Freezing data-center copper demand at today's level leaves a median 2040 deficit of 6.5 million tonnes, so the shortfall survives the failure of its most fashionable demand leg. The most-quoted bullish signal in the copper market, unusually tight visible inventories, fails its own backtest across 967 weeks of London Metal Exchange data.
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Trade and supply chainsThe Great Reallocation: China exposure rerouted through Mexico
Published July 2026
China's share of US imports fell from about 21 percent in 2017 to 9 percent for full-year 2025, while the Chinese content measured inside Mexican exports moved the other way. On OECD data, Chinese value added rose inside Mexican gross exports from 5.1 percent in 2016 to 6.7 percent in 2022, and the gap between the two maps runs at roughly 1.2 percentage points a year. Mexico bought about $133 billion of Chinese goods in 2025 and sold roughly $10 billion back. The July 2026 USMCA review named automotive rules of origin and transshipment as agenda items, which is the policy system reaching one layer upstream from the origin label.
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Trade and supply chainsIndia's manufacturing shift
Published July 2026
India captured the assembly layer of the world's most valuable manufactured product in roughly five years, passing China as the top source of US smartphone imports in the second quarter of 2025 at 44% against 25%. The stack underneath stayed Chinese: roughly 71% of the components in an India-assembled iPhone still ship in from China, and about 20% of the export value India books stays in the country on industry estimates, or closer to 6% on the stricter count from the Global Trade Research Initiative. The report separates two clocks the market treats as one claim, because assembly share is migrating at historic speed while value-added share is nearly static. Since February 24, 2026 a US-bound iPhone enters at roughly zero duty whether it ships from China or India, so the tariff wedge that built the shift has already closed.
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Critical mineralsThe rare-earth chokepoint
Published June 2026
China mines about 60% of the world's rare earths, refines roughly 91% of them, processes more than 99% of the heavy rare earths, and builds 94% of the world's finished magnets, so the leverage lives in the chemistry of refining. Within a month of taking effect, the April 2025 export-licensing regime had cut China's magnet exports 74% year over year. A 20,000-run simulation of every announced project, each generously discounted for real-world lead times, leaves China at roughly 84% of magnet-rare-earth refining in 2030, and not one run gets China below the G7's own 60% target. After being cut off in 2010, Japan needed seven years of full state backing to fall from 90% dependence to 58%, then plateaued.
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Monetary and reservesCentral-bank gold replacing Treasuries
Published April 2026
Central bank gold reserves at $4 trillion have overtaken US Treasury holdings at $3.9 trillion in sovereign portfolios for the first time since the mid-1990s, with gold at 24% of global central bank reserves against 21% for US government debt. In 2015 Treasuries made up 33% and gold just 9%. The bid is sovereign and predates the Iran conflict by three years: central banks purchased 1,037 tonnes in 2023, 1,045 tonnes in 2024, and 863 tonnes in 2025, all well above the 473-tonne average from 2010 to 2021. France completed full gold repatriation from the New York Federal Reserve in January 2026, becoming the first G7 nation to remove all gold from US custody.
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